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Abst rac twTh is  paper presents an application of the Principle of Maximum Entropy to b,,alne~ 
investment decision making under uncertainty. This principle is derived explicitly from a set of 
axioms for rational infenmce, one of these axioms being the weak form rational expectations hy- 
pothesis (REH): that agents use all the available information efficiently. This set of Mam'aptiona are 
weaker than those embedded in the strong REH. It is demonstrated that the Maxent algorithm leads 
to rational decision solutiona when the information set available to agents is very limited--so limited 
that there is no orthodox solution to the problem. Thus, we obtain a solution without the extreme 
informational ssumptions necessary to obtain a strong REH solution. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Many, if not most, economic decisions have to be made based on very incomplete information 
about the probability distributions generating outcomes. This information is often in the form 
of average market outcomes. For example, most "news" about the economy comes in the form of 
aggregates and averages: average price levels, average rate of price changes, total and per capita 
GNP, etc. Investment decisions are often made based on average market demand. Job search 
decisions are based on average market salary currently being offered in a particular profession. 
Often agents may also have some notion of variance (e.g., highest and lowest salary they may 
reasonably expect), but little or no sample data is available. This information is not enough to 
allow application of the standard statistical techniques available. Hence, decision makers face 
"Knightian uncertainty": there is insufficient sample evidence to form statistical estimates of 
the probabilities of possible outcomes (See [1] for a detailed discussion of Knightian risk and 
uncertainty.). 
This paper presents an application of the Maximum Entropy Principle (Maxent), as an algo- 
rithm for rational inference under Knightian uncertainty, to business investment decision making. 
This algorithm is derived explicitly from a set of axioms for rational inference, one of these axioms 
being the weak form rational expectations hypothesis (REH): that agents use all the available 
information efficiently. This set of assumptions i weaker than those embedded in the strong 
REH and contain the strong REH results as a special case when agents act as if they know the 
structural parameters. With the development of the strong REH, considerable progress has been 
made incorporating explicit models of expectations into economic models. Lucas and Sargent, 
amongst others, have extended Muth's strong REH hypothesis and applied it in equilibrium mod- 
els with great success [2]. Despite the successes there remains ome concern with the use of the 
strong form REH. In particular, the need for a learning model of expectations has been suggested. 
Indeed, Muth [3] and Lucas and Prescott [4] suggested that rational expectations (RE) should 
be regarded as the natural outcome of some unspecified learning and adapting on the part of 
decision makers. 
I would llke to expre~ my gratitude to Peter Faynzilberg, Peter Ferderer, Kevln P,~ffett, Kidaya Prasad and an 
anonymous referee for subetantial comments that led to considerable improvements in the paper. I r,~m,dn solely 
responsible for all errors and omi~;ous. 
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In order to solve strong RE models, it is necessary to treat agents in the economy as ff they 
know the true structure. This assumption leads to many results which are in obvious conflict 
with the evidence (see, for example, [5-6]). In particular, "rational expectations, it is thought, 
require essentially uniform beliefs at some level and imply more stationarity or stability of time 
series than is consistent with even casual observations. Put rather crudely, decision makers do 
not agree about things that keep moving around [7, p. 170]." 
The goal of the current research program on the REH, as characterized by Townsend [7], is to 
develop equilibrium models with learning and with disparate hut weak form rational expectations, 
i.e., models in which agents behave rationally and are forward looking but have incomplete 
information. The method adopted by Townsend and his co-workers has been to start with strong 
RE equilibrium models as the base and to work from this point by extending these models and 
working out solutions when certain assumptions are relaxed. 
The research program of which this paper is a part has the same goal as that of Townsend, but 
starts from a different base. To be more specific, the method adopted in this paper is to build 
from some basic axioms about rational behavior up to a model of expectations formation under 
uncertainty that involves learning and disparate hut weak form rational expectations. 
O this paper > 0 < Townsend et al. 0 
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for learning models with models 
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Townsend generalizes the strong rational expectations approach by relaxing some of the assump- 
tions embedded in that approach, in particular the assumption that beliefs are uniform across 
agents, but Townsend's approach still assumes that the laws governing parameter movement are 
known. In this paper, a model of rational inference and learning (and hence, expectations for- 
mation) applicable when these laws are not known is outlined. In the next section, an axiomatic 
theory of learning is outlined. An application of this theory to firm level investment decision 
making is considered in Section 3. The final section provides a summary and a brief overview of 
some of the issues to be addressed by further research. 
2. AN AXIOMATIC THEORY OF LEARNING 
Following E. T. Jaynes [8], we define rational learning as learning that obeys certain rules. 
These rules are deduced from simple axioms which provide a reasonable r presentation f rational 
inference. To paraphrase Jaynes, a rational agent, should he discover that he was violating these 
axioms, would wish to revise his thinking. 
The axioms are as follows: 
1. Degrees of plausibility can be represented by real numbers. The degree of plausibility of 
a proposition is a continuous, monotonic function that increases in value the greater the 
degree of plausibility. 
Note that Axiom 1 does not assert hat degrees of plausibility in actual human minds 
have a unique numerical measure, only that degrees of plausibility can be represented in
this manner. 
2. Only inferences which can be shown to follow logically from the information available 
are made, i.e., no unwarranted conclusions can be drawn in the sense that the rules of 
deductive logic cannot be violated. Hence, two propositions with the same truth value 
must be equally plausible. 
3. The Desiderata of Consistency: 
(a) All admissible algorithms for reasoning must lead to the same result, i.e., two methods 
of obtaining a solution must, if they are both correct, lead to the same answer. 
(b) All the evidence available must be taken into account. This is the weak REH: that 
agents use all the available information efficiently. 
Msdcln¢ inflexible investment decisions 249 
(c) Equivalent problems, i.e., equivalent states of knowledge, imply the same degree of 
plausibility, e.g., two rational agents with exactly the same information must draw 
the same inferences. 
Following the work of R. T. Cox [9] and E. T. Jaynes [8,10], it can be shown that the above 
axioms uniquely determine the rules by which a rational agent must reason, i.e., there is only 
one set of mathematical operations for manipulating plausibilities which has all these properties 
(See [8,11] for full development of the proofs). Furthermore, these axioms lead to a definition of 
probability as a degree of plausibility. The main result can be stated as follows: 
THEOREM 1. Given an information set I there exists a unique positive continuous monotonic 
function p(. I I) satisfying Axioms 1 to 3 which represents the degree of plausibility o£ a propo- 
sition (or event) such that: 
(i) 0 < p(x [ I) < 1, 
(ii) p(zy I zI) -- I yzX)p(y I I) -- p(v I xzI)  I I), 
p(x 1 I) + 1 I) = 1, 
(where ",z = "not x"). 
PROOF. See [8,11, Theorems 1-5]. 
From this theorem it can be shown that Bayes' rule is the unique algorithm by which proba- 
bilities are updated in the light of new information, i.e., any method of assigning probabilities 
which leads to assignments hat violate Bayes' rule must necessarily violate at least one of the 
above axioms of rational inference (see [8,11]). However, before Bayes' rule can be used to ma- 
nipulate probabilities, the available information must be encoded as probabilities. The axioms 
of rational inference can also be used to derive methods by which information can be encoded as 
probabilities. The method which follows from these axioms is the Principle of Maximum Entropy. 
The Principle of Mazimum Entropy 
The Principle of Maximum Entropy (Maxent) is a general method for encoding information 
that has proved very successful in many physics and engineering applications. (See [12]. Zeliner 
and Highfield [13] provide an econometrics application of Maxent.) Maxent provides a method 
for constructing probability distributions over possible outcomes in situations where we have 
less than perfect information concerning the nature of uncertainty (i.e., the structure of the 
"experiment" generating the outcomes faced by the agent). It is a way of rigorously embodying 
available information into the probability distribution without assuming too little or too much 
by maximizing uncertainty subject to available information. The Maxent principle was first 
introduced by E. T. Jaynes [14] as a problem solving method in statistical mechanics. To derive 
the Maxent principle from the above axioms we first require a measure of information. 
Shannon [15] proposed entropy as a measure of information. Shannon entropy can be defined 
as follows: Let A be a finite probability space composed of elementary events A with probabilities 
p(A~), 1 < i < n, p(Ai) >>_ O, Eip(Ai)  = 1. The quantity 
n 
H(A) = - y~p (Ai) In [p (A,)] 
i=1 
is the entropy of the space A (for an arbitrary choice of logarithmic base). For the definition of 
entropy relating to continuous probability density functions, see [16]. 
It is a well known result of information theory, first proved by Shannon [15], that entropy 
is a measure of information that is unique in terms of the properties one would expect of an 
information measure. 
SHANNON'S UNIQUENESS THEOREM. (The statement oft his theorem fallows that of[17].) Sup- 
pose we consider the following three basic properties as necessary for a measure of information, H. 
For a discussion of these properties, see [17, p. 2-9]. 
(1) For given n and for ~'~=1Pi = 1, the function H(pI,p2,. . .  ,Pn) takes its largest value for 
Pt = 1/n,k = 1,2, . . . ,n.  
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(2) For any two propositions or sets o/.events, A and B, 
 (AB) = H(A) + E[H(B) I A] 
where H(AB) = the amount of information given by the realization of two experir~nt~ 
with a finite set of possible outcomes, A and B, and E[H(B) [ A] - the conditional 
expectation of H(B) given A has occurred. 
(3) H(pl,p2,.. . ,p,,0) = ,p,) 
Let H(pI,P2, .. • ,Pn) be a/'unction defined for any integer n and/'or al/~Jues PI,P~,... ,Pn such 
that Pi ~_ 0, (i = 1,. . . ,  n), Epi = 1. If~or any n this/.unction is continuous with respect o all its 
arguments, and if it has properties 1, 2, and 3, then 
n 
H(pl,P2,... ,/~) = -A ~"~pi ln(pi), where A/s a positive constant. 
i=1  
PROOF. [17, p. 10-13]. 
This theorem shows that the expression for the entropy of a distribution is the only one p__,~i_'ble 
that has the general properties 1 to 3, which seem necessary in view of the actual meaning of the 
concept of entropy (as a measure of information or uncertainty). If we accept Shannon entropy 
as an information measure and the axioms of rational inference, then Maxent follows directly. 
The Maximum Entropy Principle, stated briefly, is: 
When we make inferences based on incomplete information, we should draw them from 
that probability distribution that has the maximum entropy permitted by the information 
we do have [12, p. 940]. 
This can be expressed as the following theorem. 
THEOREM 9. (UNIQUENESS OF MAXENT). For an arbitrary information structure I, the proba- 
bility distribution with maximum entropy permitted by the information set, I, is the only prob- 
ability distribution that can be used as a representation of the information set without violating 
the ax/oms of rational inference. 
PROOF. Suppose Prn~x is the probability distribution which has maximum entropy, Hmu, per- 
mitted by the available information. 
(i) I f  there exists a probability distribution p. with entropy H. such that H. <//max then p, 
contains more information than pmffix. Hence, using p. to represent the available informa- 
tion violates Axiom 2. 
(ii) If there exists a probability distribution p* with entropy H* such that H* > Hm~ then f 
contains less information than Pmax. Hence, using p* to represent the available information 
violates Axiom 3(b). 
Therefore, Pmax is the only probability distribution that fully represents he available information 
and nothing else. 
To summarize, if we accept entropy as an information measure, then distributions of higher 
entropy "assume less." That is, when there is no relevant information for formulating inferences 
about the probability distribution over possible outcomes, entropy is maximized. This is repre- 
sented by a uniform distribution over the outcomes. As the amount of information one has about 
the phenomena in question increases, entropy and uncertainty are constrained from above and 
the probability distribution over possible outcomes deviates from the uniform distribution. In 
the limit where we have perfect information, entropy and uncertainty go to zero. 
To see how the Maxent principle works, let Pi be the probability associated with the ~h out- 
come z~ whose possible values are z~,..., zm. Suppose we seek a discrete probability distribution 
p(z) - (Pt,... ,Pro) over the possible zis which satisfies 
m 
Pi ~ O, (i = 1, . . . ,m);  ~p~ = I. 
i=!  
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(Maxent is equally applicable to the continuous distribution case; see [16].) The entropy attached 
to this probability distribution is the number 
\ m 
Hm = Hm(pi,...  ,Pm) - - ~P ,  ha(p,), (1) 
i= l  
where Jim is a concave and continuous function, insuring that there is only one global maximum. 
Maxent states that we choose the probability distribution from the set of possible probability 
distributions which maximizes Shannon's entropy, H, and is compatible with one or several given 
moment values. That is, we choose the probability distribution which has maximum uncertainty 
subject o what we know, which is embodied in the moments. 
To operationalize the principle, we maximize a Lagrangean multiplier which embodies the 
known information in constraints. If we have no information other than the number of possible 
outcomes rn, the Lagrange function becomes 
L - Hm(p,,... ,Pro) - A, p, - 1 
k /= l  
(2) 
where  )t I is a Lagrange multiplier. Maximization yields 
1 
p, = - -  for i = 1,. . . ,  rn. (3) 
Tn 
Given only our knowledge about the number of possible outcomes the probability distribution 
which maximizes entropy or uncertainty is represented by the uniform distribution. 
Now consider what happens when we have more information. Suppose we know the mean value 
of z, E(z) = ~_,~'=, z~p~. Applying the Principle of Maxent we choose the probability distribution 
that maximizes entropy subject o this information. In this case, the Lagrange function becomes 
(4) 
where A, and A2 are the Lagrange multipliers. The first order conditions in this case become: 
- lnp i  - 1 - AI - A2z ,  = 0, 
~z,p i -1  =0,  
/=1 
m 
• ,p, - E( , )  = o. 
/=1 
The solutions to these first order equations are 
exp( -~0x~) (i = 1 . . ,  m) (5) 
P '  - -  m , • 
~-~i= 1 exp(--A0z/) 
where A0 is the solution to the exponential equation 
m 
[~, - E(~)] exp {-~0[~,  - E(~)I} = 0. 
If the random variable is nondegenerate (i.e., takes on at least two different values), such a 
solution exists and is unique. For a more detailed escription, see [18]. 
252 J.A. MILLS 
Summary 
Axioms I to 3 lead to a unique theory of rational earning which involves two basic algorithmic 
steps. First, the available information must be encoded in probability distributions. The principle 
of maximum entropy represents a unique rule for doing this. Second, the probability assignments 
must be updated in the light of new (encoded) information. It turns out that Bayes' theorem 
is the only method for updating probability assignments that satisfies Axioms I to 3. This 
provides us with s unique model of rational earning in the sense that all other models of learning 
must either be equivalent to Bayesian learning or violate one of the axioms of rational inference. 
There is already a considerable economic literature that considers Bayesian learning models of 
expectations. ([19] is the seminal reference; see also [6,20] and references contained in these.) In 
the following section, some applications of maximum entropy methods to economic problems are 
presented as examples of how this approach may be used. 
3. INVESTMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY 
Two examples applying the principle of maximum entropy to economic problems will be pre- 
sented in this section. The first is due to Jaynes [8], the second addresses an issue recently raised 
by Sims [21]. 
Example 1: Jaynes' Widget Problem 
An example of how Maxent can be applied to model decision making under uncertainty is "the 
widget problem" developed by E. T. Jaynes [8]. In this section, a version of the widget problem 
is presented to illustrate the application of the theory of rational earning in a microeconondc 
setting. 
Consider a firm which produces three types of goods A, B and C, all of which involve a 
similar production process (e.g., running shoes, tennis shoes and cycling shoes, or three different 
sizes of car tire). As part of its advertising technique, the firm guarantees that it will meet all 
orders within one business day. However, only one type of good can be produced at any point 
in time because the same equipment is used for each (in our examples, the only difference in the 
production process might be different molds for different ypes of shoes or tires). Furthermore, 
the costs of shutting down production during the working day are too high for this to be practical. 
The manager of the firm must decide which type of product will be produced at the beginning 
of each day. 
First, we will consider a case when the solution to this decision problem is intuitively obvious. 
Suppose the only information available to the manager at the beginning of the day is inventory 
stocks; the manager will simply choose the good for which the inventory stock is lowest. Maxi- 
mizing entropy subject o the constraints implied by this information leads us to the same result. 
The analysis proceeds as follows. 
First, the information available must be encoded as probabilities. Since the manager has no 
information on orders for each good, Maxent indicates that we must consider orders of each type 
of good equally likely (see Equation (3)). Given the managers information set I, the probability 
of an order for each type of good must be equal. Since there are only three types of goods, m - 3 
in Equation (3) and we have 
1 
p(order for A = z ] I) = p(order for B = z [ I) = p(order for C = z [ I) = ~. 
Note that this part of the process does not involve any decision making by the manager and so 
the result is independent of any utility (or loss) function involved in the final decision. 
We must now specify a loss function for the manager. To keep the analysis fairly simple we will 
assume the manager is myopic in that he only cares about the current business day. (Results from 
recursive analysis of optimal control problems indicate that the optimal non-myopic strategy can 
also be treated in a similar manner; see [22,23].) If all orders are filled at the end of the day, 
the manager is satisfied because he will not have lost any profit making opportunities and all his 
customers will be satisfied and therefore likely to return. The more unfilled orders at the end 
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of the day, the greater the loss in terms of profits and future customers. The appropriate loss 
function is thus the following ramp function: 
g(=)={ o, ~= < 0; (6) 
z, ~ z > O. 
Thus, for the decision to produce type of good i, d/, number of orders received that day for type 
of good j,  nj, number of good j in stock, sj, and amount produced of good chosen, q, the loss 
functions, given there are three types of goods, are 
For decision dl: 
L(dl ,n l ,n2,nz)  = g(nl - 81 - -  q)+g("2 - 82) +g(na - sz). (7) 
For decision d2: 
L(dg, n l ,  I"12, ha)  -" g(n l  - -  81) + g("2  --  S2 -- ~) -I- g(ns  - sa) .  (8) 
For decision d3: 
L(d3 ,  -1 , -2 ,  "3 )  "" g ( " l  - -  81) "t" g ( "2  --  S2) -{- g(n3  - -  83 - -  q).  (9) 
Suppose the present stock of goods is 81 = 100, s2 = 150 and sa = 50, and total production for 
a day, q = 200. The decision problem with only this information is trivial; clearly the manager 
would decide to produce good 3, so let's increase his information set. Suppose the manager is 
also told that the average number of each type of good ordered per day is nl = 50, n2 = 100 
and n3 - 10, respectively. Intuition and a little reflection suggests that he should probably 
produce good 2. There is no orthodox algorithm with which to check our intuition however, but 
application of Maxent leads directly to the answer we expect. 
The possible "states of nature" are hi, n2 and ha, where ni is a random variable with possible 
values ni = 0, 1, 2, . . . ,  representing the number of good i ordered that day. The probability of 
an unfilled order depends on the probability of receiving total orders for a good greater than 
the inventory stock. The manager must infer the probability of observing values for hi, n2 
and ns given the information set available to him, I2, i.e., he must determine p(nl,n2,na I/2). 
The information available is that E(nx) = 50, E(-2) = 100 and E(n3) = 10. These are the 
constraints to be imposed in maximizing entropy (e.f. Equation (4)). The first order conditions 
give 
1 
E(n,) - (eX, _ 1)' i=  1,2,3. (10) 
So 
pC-l, -2, -31 x.,) = pl (-1) P2("2) P3("3) (I i) 
and 
So 
p,(.,) = ( I -  e -A') ~-~'"' 
_ 1 f E(n,) ,~n, 
[E(n,) -I- 1] I, [E(n,) -k 11J " 
(1~) 
l- 
P I ( " I )  = 
I CI00~n2 
P~(n2) = ~ \ 101) 
Ps(na) = 1~ \11)  
(13) 
(14) 
(15) 
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Therefore, the expected loes is: 
E(Li) -- ~ pi(nl, "2,"-a I 12) L(di, nl, n2, n.a) 
~1 ~f'/.2 in3 
which gives 
E(L1) -- 
(16) 
111 n 9 
+ r C--a I/2) g(.-a - ,-a). (17) 
vls  
ECL2) = ~-'~P1("I [ 12) 9(111 - sl) q- ~":~p2(n2 1/2)9("2 - 82 - 200) 
I I I  ~2  
+ ~'-~/~(n-a [/2) g(--a - s-a), (18) 
E(L ) =  pi(-I I I 2 )g ( . l  - +  .p2(.2 - 82) 
n l  112 
+ ~-~ps(n-a I 12) g(n-a - ss  - 200). (19) 
~2 
Calculating these: 
E(LI) = 22.70, E(L2) = 10.06 and E(L-a) = 29.38. So our rational manager would make 
decision d2 with information 19. 
It is worth emphasizing at this point that there is no orthodox statistical method for encoding 
information of the type available to the manager. One cannot util~e Bayesian decision theory 
directly because this requires prior probabilities. Taking n subjective Bayesian approach, intuition 
may suggest s suitable prior, but this is an entirely ad hoe procedure with no guarantee that the 
axioms of rational inference have not been violated in some way. The Maxent prior is unique in 
the sense that any other prior must be equivalent to the Maxent prior; otherwise it violates the 
axioms in some way. 
The inference and decision problem faced by the manager can be made considerably more 
complicated. Jaynes provides olutions to the problem when the manager is also informed that 
the average size of individual orders is 75, I0 and 20 respectively, and when he is told that an 
order for 40 of good 3 has just been received. The managers state of knowledge thus becomes 
Table 1. 
Number of good in stock 
Average total daily orders 
Average size of an individual order 
Ord~ already received 
Good 1 
200 
50 
75 
Good 2 Good 3 
150 50 
100 10 
10 20 
40 
For the sake of brevity, the details of the calculations to determine which decision should be 
made axe omitted since they are clearly presented in [8,24]. 1 It is clear, however, that intuition 
is not much help in choosing a prior distribution, nor in making a decision when the information 
set is as given in the above table. Maxent leads straightforwardly to answers that are consistent 
with the axioms outlined in Section 2. 
Ezample ~: Inference and Decision Making 
In a recent paper, Sims [21] raises the question: How might rational agents draw inferences when 
the only information available is in the form of estimated means (and possibly other moments). 
IFm" the second and third states of knowledge, the manager would choose to produce good 1 in both cases. 
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This is exactly the problem addressed by the Max imum Entropy Principle. This point can most 
clearly be made by an example. 
Suppose the manager from Example 1 is faced with the same decision problem, but his in- 
formation set is slightly different. Namely, at the beginning of each day the manager receives a 
report from the forecasting division of the firm which provides forecasts of current daily demand 
for each type of good produced. We will consider three states of knowledge that might result 
from this scenario. In the first situation, the manager is given only a point estimate of demand 
for each good. This situation is exactly the same as the first state considered in Example 1. Now 
suppose the manager is also provided with standard deviations for these point estimates, giving 
some indication of the accuracy he can expect from the forecasts. His information set would look 
something like this. 
Table 2. State of Knowledge 2. 
Estimate of demand for good i
Standard Deviation of estimate 
Good 1 Good 2 
50.0 100.0 
25.0 50.0 
Good 3 
20.0 
12.5 
The best decision is not intuitively obvious in this case. In order to make use of statistical 
decision theory, this information must be encoded as a probability distribution. Finally, suppose 
the manager also receives an estimate of the third moment of the empirical distribution. 2 
Table 3. State of Knowledge 3. 
Good I 
Estimate of demand for good i 50.0 
Standard Deviation of estimate 25.0 
Skewness of sample distribution 0.0 
Good 2 
100.0 
50.0 
0.7 
Good 3 
20.0 
12.5 
0.0 
Once again, in order to make use of decision theoretic techniques, a probability distribution 
must be chosen to represent this information. There is no orthodox method for choosing such a 
distribution; furthermore, subjective Bayesian methods are entirely ad hoc. In this example, the 
maximum entropy distribution for these different states of knowledge will be calculated numeri- 
cally rather than maximize ntropy analytically. To do so, we can utilize the program Mazent 1.16 
developed by Jaynes [25]. This demonstrates that analytical tractability is not required to obtain 
the Maxent prior distribution. 
The priors obtained for states of knowledge 2 and 3 are illustrated in Figures 1 to 3. Figures 1 
and 3 illustrate the Maxent distribution for goods 1 and 3 in both states. Figure 2 illustrates the 
distributions for good 2 under states 2 and 3. Notice that there is not much difference between 
the two distributions for good 2. This small change is more than enough to effect the decision 
outcome however. Given these prior distributions the solution to the decision problem is readily 
obtained from Equations (17), (18) and (19), substituting the new prior distributions for those 
given in these equations. These calculations lead to the following results. 
Table 4. 
State of Knowledge 2 State of Knowledge 3
E(L1)  = 0.298 E(L I  ) = 0.5~ 
B(L2)  = 0.388 E(L2)  = 0.386 
E(L3) -- 0.512 E(Ls) = 0.806 
2Skewness = E~(x~ - #)3 p(z~)/~3, where o = standard eviation. 
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Therefore the manager would choose to produce good 1 in state of knowledge 2, and good 2 
with state of knowledge 3. 
Economic theory has concentrated exclusively on rational decision making. Example 2 illus- 
trates the fact that before rational decisions can be made, rational inferences must be drawn. If 
incorrect inferences are drawn from the data, then rational decision making may lead to incorrect 
decisions, despite the fact that the decision maker is blameless. Clearly rational economic agents 
would not wish to base rational decisions upon irrational inferences. Example 2 also illustrates 
how inferences and decisions are made when the only information available is in the form of 
average market outcomes. As stated at the beginning of this paper, this is often the only type of 
information available to economic agents. 
4. CONCLUSION 
The above examples how how the Maxent algorithm leads to rational decision solutions when 
the information set available to agents is very limited--so limited that there is no orthodox solu- 
tion to the problem. Thus, we obtain a solution without the extreme informational assumptions 
necessary to obtain a strong REH solution. 
The examples also demonstrate hat small changes in the information set available can lead 
rational agents to make drastic changes in economic decisions, i.e., greater uncertainty implies 
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Figure 3. Maxent probability distribution for good 3 in states of knowledge 2 and 3. 
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greater volatility of expectations and hence, economic behavior that is determined by expec- 
tations, such as investment. Investment will be more volatile than consumption because there 
is a greater degree of uncertainty about expected future profits and interest rates than about 
expected future consumer income. 
If we accept he axioms of rational inference outlined above, then the principle of maximum 
entropy and Bayes' theorem are unique rules for encoding information as probabilities and updat- 
ing these probabilities in the light of new information. Any other methods for drawing inferences 
with incomplete information must be equivalent to these or violate the axioms in some way. It is 
worth noting that Maxent is not a statistical method. Shannon entropy is simply a measure of the 
amount of information embodied in a probability distribution. Maxent makes use of this measure 
to provide a rule for choosing a probability distribution to represent the available information. 
A subjective Bayesian would choose a probability distribution to represent 'prior' information 
based on intuition and experience, but there is no guarantee that the axioms of rational inference 
have not been violated in this case, and when intuition and experience fails Maxent does not. 
In Section 3, some initial steps in applying E. T. Jaynes' theory of rational inference and the 
Maximum Entropy Principle to economic issues were taken. There are many areas in economics 
where this work could be fruitfully applied. Some planned extensions ofthe work outlined in this 
paper will address the following issues. 
1. Heterogeneous agents: Rational agents with heterogeneous beliefs can be modeled by 
indexing agents using entropy as a measure of the amount of information available to 
them. Issues addressed by Townsend [7] can then be studied in a model where agents do 
not know the laws governing movement. 
2. A solution to the Ellsberg paradox: If information is treated as an economic good, then 
economic agents always prefer more information to less. The use of Shannon entropy 
as a measure of information leads to simple and intuitively appealing solutions to some 
problems with the expected utility framework, particularly the paradoxical behavior of 
subjects in an experiment conducted by Ellsberg [26]. 
3. Bounded rationality: Given an exphcit axiomatic theory of rational inference, a natural 
extension is to consider what modifications would lead to the systematic deviations from 
rationality observed in reality, such as the 'law of small numbers' phenomenon, asdescribed 
in [27]. 
4. Learning and convergence to RE equilibria: The relationship between the work herein 
and the current RE research agenda was outlined in the first section of this paper. A 
link between the two can be established by drawing from results obtained in the rapidly 
growing literature on learning models of expectations, and convergence of these models to 
RE equilibria. 
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